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of the conventional exchange of medical information 123 in view of the
conclusion reached in Friemanv. Miller,124 wherein it was decided that
such reports are protected by CPLR 3101(d) as material created in
preparation for litigation. The medical report was thus held to be
properly admissible.
CPLR 3140: Documents supporting appraisalreport held not subject
to disclosure.
In promulgating CPLR 3140 the legislature expressly gave each
appellate division the power to disregard the prohibitions against disclosure found in CPLR 3101(c) and (d) when reviewing appraisals in
proceedings for condemnation, appropriation, or review of tax assessments. By directing each appellate division to promulgate its own
disclosure rules for such appraisals, the legislature recognized that
the several districts within each appellate division have different needs
since the volume of litigation varies significantly from district to district.1 25
The position of the fourth department was authoritatively set
forth in City of Buffalo v. Ives,1'2 wherein it was held that all appraisal
reports made in preparation for a condemnation proceeding were subject to disclosure- not merely the highest or lowest appraisal which
might be used by the interested party to his best advantage. 127 Although
this is obviously the more desirable result for purposes of broad disclosure, it is difficult to justify under the specific language of the rule, 28
which presumably was intended to exclude from disclosure those reports which the party did not intend to use at trial.2 9 This interpretation of the fourth department rule has led to a conflict among the
departments as to the scope of CPLR 3140.130
123 See 3 WK&M 1 3121.18 (1969); see also Gugliano v. Levi, 24 App. Div. 2d 591,
262 N.Y.S.2d 372 (2d Dep't 1965), noted in The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 303,
335-86 (1966).
12428 App. Div. 2d 1126, 284 N.Y.S.2d 225 (2d Dep't 1967); cf. Smith v. Schulman,
28 App. Div. 2d 922, 282 N.Y.S.2d 57 (2d Dep't 1967).
125 3 WK&M J 3140.01 (1969).
12655 Misc. 2d 730, 286 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1968). See The Quarterly
Survey, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 302, 328-29 (1968).
127 As reported in a fourth department case prior to the enactment of CPLR 3140:
"[A] party should not be permitted to obtain more than one appraisal and then use only
the lower or lowest and withhold the other or others.
Brummer v. State, 25 App.
Div. 2d 245, 247, 269 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606 (4th Dep't 1964).
128 See 22 NYCRR § 1089.14. Paragraph a. of the rule requires disclosure "of all
appraisal reports intended to be used at the trial." (Emphasis added.)
129 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3140, supp. commentary 176-77 (1968).
130 Compare In re Inwood, 55 Misc. 2d 806, 286 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1968) with City of Buffalo v. Ives, 55 Misc. 2d 780, 286 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1968).

1970]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

The scope of 3140, as it pertains to CPLR 3101(d),'3' was at issue
in County of Onondagav. Lawson Acres, Inc.13 2 The parties in Lawson
Acres had made the requisite exchange of appraisal reports envisaged
by the appellate division rules. However, because the defendant's
report allegedly relied upon, and incorporated plans for, subdivisions
and development of the property, the plaintiff moved for disclosure
of the maps and plans relating thereto.
In denying the motion the court in the instant case held that
neither CPLR 8140 nor the fourth department rules mandated a
finding
that the maps and plans which were created by the defendant
[were] so integral a part of the appraisal report as to be considered
133
part of the report itself and therefore subject to exchange.
The court further held that the rule contemplated nothing more than
the exchange of a report which was complete as to the experts' conclusions plus "the facts, figures and calculations by which the con34
clusions were reached.'
This result is rather difficult to accept. Apparently, it is a manifestation of the court's belief that Ives leaves no other way to keep any
information undisclosed - even information which is not intended for
use at the trial. Under the Ives rationale, anything done in the preparation of an appraisal report, whether or not the report is to be based
at trial, is subject to disclosure. However, in the other departments,
a litigant could avoid using any appraisal which alluded to sensitive
information, and in that manner it would be undiscoverable by the
other party.
Further problems are posed by the holding reached in Lawson
Acres. First of all, it seems rather ludicrous to conclude that an appraisal report incorporates a map and yet, concomitantly, hold that
the map is not an "integral part" of the report, or that the report
states "facts, figures and calculations" from which conclusions may be
drawn without necessarily relying upon the map. Moreover, disclosure
would appear to be compelled by the fact that the existence of the
map was put in issue by the very person who sought to exclude it.
If courts in the Fourth Department are required to arrive at decisions such as that in Lawson Acres in an effort to avoid the harshness
131 CPLR 3101(d) provides inter alia: "The following shall not be obtainable ...
1. any opinion of an expert prepared for litigation...."
132 60 Misc. 2d 384, 303 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1969).
133 Id. at 386, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
134 Id., 303 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
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of Ives, the appellate division of that department or the Court of
Appeals should seize upon the earliest opportunity to overrule or
limit the case.
ARTICLE

32 -

ACCELERATED JUDGMENT

CPRL 3211(c): Second department disapproves of court's sua sponte
treatment of motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment.
In denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defense of lack of standing, 135 the supreme court in Mareno v. Kibbe136 held that the defense
as stated in the answer was valid, and, on its own motion, granted
summary relief to the nonmoving party.137 However, the appellate
division reversed on the ground that the lower court had misinterpreted the substantive law relating to appellant's standing to sue. But
what is perhaps more significant is the judicial chastisement of special
term for its sua sponte treatment of plaintiff's motion to strike a
defense under CPLR 3211(b) as a motion for summary judgment by
the opposing party.
3
The commentators suggest that 3211(c) may be used sua sponte' 8
by the courts and that it may be used "to direct judgment against the
moving party in the absence of a cross-motion .... 139 Furthermore,
the revisors, in making an addition to this section, manifested the
intention that it was meant to apply to motions made under 3211(b)
as well as to those made under 3211(a). 40 Therefore, it should be
135 See CPLR 3211(b): "A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground that a defense is not stated or has no merit."
13656 Misc. 2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968), modified, 32
App. Div. 2d 825, 302 N.Y.S.2d 324 (2d Dep't 1969).
In this taxpayers' action, plaintiffs sought certain equitable and monetary relief from
defendants in the latters' official capacities as Supervisor and Councilmen of the Town
Board of Yorktown. The defendants alleged as an affirmative defense the plaintiffs' lack
of standing to sue. The substantive holding of the lower court was that while plaintiffs
were taxpayers of the town, they were not taxpayers of the specific subdivision of the
town affected by the action of the defendants, and so were not "interested parties" within
the meaning of N.Y. GEN. Murac. LAw § 23 (McKinney 1965). Therefore, because the defendants had a valid defense to the action, the court, on its own motion, considered
plaintiffs' motion to dismiss a defense as a cross-motion for summary judgment authorized
by CPLR 3211(c).
137 CPLR 3211(c) provides, inter alia, that:
Upon the hearing of a motion made under subdivision (a) or (b), either party
may submit any evidence that could properly be considered on a motion for summary judgment and the court may treat the motion as a motion for summary
judgment. ....

138 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3211, supp. commentary 180, 191 (1965).
139 4 WK&M
3211.50 (1968).
140 Compare Fjnsr Ra'. rule 31.1(b) at 85 with SIXTH REP. rule 3211(c) at 332.

